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We study multiagent logit-rule-driven evolutionary games on a square lattice whose pair interactions are
composed of a maximal number of nonoverlapping elementary coordination games describing Ising-type
interactions between just two of the available strategies. Using Monte Carlo simulations we investigate the macro-
scopic noise-level-dependent behavior of the two- and three-pair games and the critical properties of the
continuous phase transtitions these systems exhibit. The four-strategy game is shown to be equivalent to a
system that consists of two independent and identical Ising models.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Due to their ubiquity in nature and society, cooperation and
coordination have garnered scientific interest across various
fields of research, ranging from magnetism to biology to
sociophysics [1–9]. Multiagent evolutionary games [10–14]
are a family of model systems used to study the spontaneous
emergence of cooperation. In these models, individual players,
who are located at the sites of a lattice or a graph, repeatedly
play two-player games with their neighbors and change their
strategies according to a dynamical rule based on their payoffs.
The concept of matrix decomposition [12,15–18] has
revealed that payoff matrices, which define player incomes
in two-player games [11,12,19,20], are linear combinations
of basis matrices that form four orthogonal subsets and
represent different types of interactions: self-dependence,
cross-dependence, coordination, and cyclic dominance. These
game classes are clearly distinguishable via a few key matrix
properties. Coordination and cyclic dominance games are
defined by symmetric and antisymmetric payoff matrices
whose each row and column sum is zero. A game’s self-
dependent components have the same entries along their
rows which are equal to the row averages of the game in
question. Cross-dependent components are similarly derived
from column averages. This decomposition method allows us
to systematically analyze how changing the payoff parameters
impacts the behavior of a multiagent game system and identify
those where coordination between selfish individual players
may spontaneously emerge.
In the original coordination game [20–24], two players
independently choose one of two available strategies. If they
have both made the same choice, then they both receive
1 (unit of payoff), and they each lose the same amount
otherwise. A set of n(n − 1)/2 similar games spans the
subspace of n-strategy coordination-type games [16]. In these
elementary coordination games, one of the 2 × 2 subgames
(e.g., where players are restricted to use only their ith and j th
strategies) is the aforementioned original coordination game
and other strategy pairings provide no payoffs. Even among
these very simple coordination-type games coordination can
emerge in different ways. If strategy updates are governed
by the logit rule [25–29] and the players are located at the
sites of a square lattice, then the number of neutral strategies
plays a decisive role [30]: When the number of strategies is
below a threshold value (n < nth), the system undergoes a
continuous (Ising-type) order-disorder phase transition as the
noise level is increased; otherwise, a first-order phase transition
can be observed. Adding a self-dependent component to the
elementary coordination game does not necessarily destroy
coordination [31]. In fact, it can be used to change the critical
noise level and even the order of the phase transition.
In this paper we will continue the systematic analysis of
coordination games played on a square lattice and investigate
games composed of a maximal number of nonoverlapping
elementary coordination games. Two elementary coordination
games overlap if they share one of their coordinated strategies.
It will be shown that the four- and six-strategy games are
characterized by multidimensional order parameters, the phase
transitions of which are still continuous; one of the four-
strategy game’s phase transitions seems to still belong to
the Ising class, whereas the six-strategy case is described
by a different set of critical exponents. Another well-known
family of coordination-type games shows a similar variety in
critical behavior: Potts-type models, which are made up of all
possible elementary coordination games (up to an additional
irrelevant game component), also have their own universality
classes [32].
The linear decomposition of payoff matrices does not only
provide a systematic way to investigate the breadth of emergent
phenomena associated with the family of classical spin models,
but it could also similarily serve as a framework for the
classification of the universality classes of critical systems.
For example, Monte Carlo simulations have indicated that
extending the Ising model with a sufficiently small number
of neutral strategies and a properly chosen additional self-
dependent game component does not change the system’s
critical properties [30,31]. Combining more elementary co-
ordination games, however, results in models like clock
models, Potts models, the Ashkin-Teller model, etc., which
(with the notable exception of the two-Ising-pair game or
four-state clock model [33,34]) belong to different universality
classes. This suggests that a better understanding of general
coordination games could lead to a deeper explanation of the
concept of universality.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows: Section II
is a detailed introduction of the models we studied. In Sec. III
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we give an overview of the methods we used to analyze these
models and present our results. Section IV summarizes our
main conclusions.
II. MODELS AND GENERAL FEATURES
We study evolutionary games on a square lattice of N =
L × L sites with periodic boundary conditions [11,12,14].
Each of the sites hosts one of the N equivalent players who
repeatedly play the same one-shot game with their four nearest
neighbors. Players can choose from n different pure strategies,
which are represented by n-dimensional standard unit vectors,
that is, the ith strategy is represented by the ith unit vector.
As a shorthand we name each player after the site he or she
lives on, for example, the player at site x will be referred to as
player x. Player x’s income in a single round of the game is
given by
u˜x(sx) =
∑
δ
sx · Asx+δ, (1)
where sx denotes the strategy chosen by player x, the
summation runs over their nearest neighbors at sites x + δ,
and the payoffs of the two-player game are defined by the
n × n matrix A [11,12,19,20].
Between each round of playing one-shot games, players are
allowed to change their strategy in random sequential order
following the so-called logit rule: The probability of player x
switching from strategy sx to any available pure strategy s′x is
w(s′x) =
eu˜x (s
′
x )/K∑
sx
eu˜x (sx )/K
. (2)
In other words, players do not deterministically choose their
best response, but they do exponentially favor strategies that
promise higher payoffs, under the assumption that their neigh-
bors do not modify their strategies [25–29]. The parameter
K can be thought of as a measure of noise affecting the
decision-making abilities of individual players.
So-called potential games are games in which the incentives
for unilateral strategy changes are described by a single
function for all players, that is, games for which exists a U
potential function that satisfies
u˜x(sx) − u˜x(s′x) = U (s) − U (s′), (3)
where s′y = sy for all y = x in the strategy profiles s = {sx}
and s′ = {s′x}. In the present multiagent lattice game the whole
system’s potential is
U (s) = 1
2
∑
x,δ
sx · Vsx+δ, (4)
where V is the potential matrix of the pair interaction. Methods
for the evaluation of V (if it exists) are given in Ref. [12].
Potential games governed by the logit rule evolve into the
Boltzmann distribution [35,36]: The probabilityp(s) of finding
the system in strategy profile s becomes
p(s) = e
U (s)/K∑
s′ e
U (s′)/K . (5)
This also means that multiagent logit-rule-driven evolutionary
potential games essentially behave like classical spin models
and can be studied using the principles and methods of statis-
tical physics. Strategy profiles with maximal U (s) correspond
to preferred Nash-equilibria (ground states in the terminology
of statistical physics).
All matrices that define potential games are linear compo-
sitions of cross-dependent, self-dependent, and coordination-
type games [12,15–17]. These game classes represent
nonstrategic environmental effects, self-determination, and
player-player interactions, respectively. A purely cross-
dependent payoff matrix has the same entries in each of its
columns, which means that the row player has no influence
over his or her payoff that is controlled by the player’s sur-
roundings instead. Conversely, a self-dependent game’s payoff
matrix is composed of rows filled with identical elements.
In this situation the row player’s choice of strategy decides
his or her payoff regardless of what their opponents may do.
Coordination-type games represent actual player-player inter-
actions where both players equally affect the game’s outcome.
A general n-strategy coordination-type game’s payoff
matrix is a linear combination of payoff matrices of elementary
coordination games that describe Ising-type coordination
between strategies p and q (p < q), while the remaining n − 2
strategies are neutral, that is, choosing one of them always
yields zero payoff for both players [16,30]. The elements of
such an elementary payoff matrix are
dij (p,q; n) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 for i = j = p
1 for i = j = q
−1 for i = p and j = q
−1 for i = q and j = p
0 otherwise.
(6)
A general n-strategy coordination-type game’s payoff matrix
is symmetric, and each of its row and column sums are
zero [16]:
A(coord) =
∑
1p<qn
αpqd(p,q; n)
=
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
β1 −α12 · · · −α1n
−α12 β2 · · · −α2n
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
−α1n −α2n · · · βn
⎞
⎟⎟⎠. (7)
In games described by A(coord) the maximal Aij value may
be one of the diagonal elementsβp =
∑
q =p αpq , in which case
all players follow the corresponding strategy in the preferred
Nash equilibrium. If the sum of elementary interactions is
dominated by an anticoordination game component, that is,
max(Aij ) = −αpq , then in the ground state the neighboring
players should play different strategies, namely p and q, to
maximize payoffs. It is important to emphasize that this is only
possible on bipartite lattices, like the square lattice in question,
where twofold degenerate sublattice ordered strategy distribu-
tions exist. These anticoordinated systems can be mapped onto
their coordinated counterparts (with two equivalent ordered
homogeneous ground states) by exchanging the labels of
anticoordinated strategy pairs on one of the sublattices.
In the following we will assume n = 2m > 2 to be an
even number of strategies and consider a highly symmetric
family of coordination-type games, namely games composed
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of m equally paying nonoverlapping elementary coordination
games. (We say that two different elementary coordination
games overlap if they share one of their coordinated strategies.)
As a shorthand, we will call these games m-Ising-pair games.
Up to a possible relabeling of strategies every unit-strength
m-Ising-pair game’s payoff matrix can be expanded in the
following way:
A(m)I =
m∑
τ=1
d(2τ − 1,2τ ; 2m). (8)
In the m = 2 case there are three equivalent two-Ising-
pair games, namely those defined by the following three
commuting 4 × 4 payoff matrices:
d(1,2; 4) + d(3,4; 4) =
⎛
⎜⎝
1 −1 0 0
−1 1 0 0
0 0 1 −1
0 0 −1 1
⎞
⎟⎠, (9)
d(1,3; 4) + d(2,4; 4) =
⎛
⎜⎝
1 0 −1 0
0 1 0 −1
−1 0 1 0
0 −1 0 1
⎞
⎟⎠, (10)
d(1,4; 4) + d(2,3; 4) =
⎛
⎜⎝
1 0 0 −1
0 1 −1 0
0 −1 1 0
−1 0 0 1
⎞
⎟⎠. (11)
The first of these payoff matrices, Eq. (9), is of the canonical
form prescribed by Eq. (8). By swapping strategy labels 2 and
3 we get the matrix given by Eq. (10), while exchanging the
labels of the second and fourth strategies leads to the payoff
matrix of Eq. (11). The second matrix [see Eq. (10)] defines
the model also known as the four-state clock model [33,34,37]
where the states are characterized by angles sx = θi = 2πin (i =
1,2, · · · ,n) and the interactions between neighboring sites (x
and y) are given as cos(θsx − θsy ).
An interesting property of the four-state clock model, and
consequently of the two-Ising-pair game, is its equivalence
to a system made up of two identical independent uncoupled
Ising models with dimensionless coupling coefficients of 1/2
[34]. If we assume that the two-Ising-pair game has only one
phase transition, then Kramers and Wannier’s duality argument
[38–41] predicts that its critical temperature is
Kc(2) = 1
ln(√2 + 1)  1.134593. (12)
This is the half of the critical temperature Kc(1) of the
traditional Ising model [42], and in the present notation
Kc(1) = 2Kc(2).
This equivalence can actually be considered as a special
case of a correspondence between two more general models
that are also related to two-Ising-pair games: the Ashkin-Teller
model and a two-layer Ising model with four-spin interactions.
The Ashkin-Teller model [43] is a four-state model in which
the pair interactions are defined by the following payoff matrix:
A =
⎛
⎜⎝
ε ε′ ε′′ ε′′′
ε′ ε ε′′′ ε′′
ε′′ ε′′′ ε ε′
ε′′′ ε′′ ε′ ε
⎞
⎟⎠. (13)
In the terminology of game theory this interaction is composed
of the three games defined by Eqs. (9)–(11) with coefficients
(ε′ − ε), (ε′′ − ε), and (ε′′′ − ε), where ε = (ε + ε′ + ε′′ +
ε′′′)/4, and an irrelevant component described by the all-one
matrix. Evidently, this system becomes equivalent to the
traditional Potts model [33] if ε′ = ε′′ = ε′′′ = −ε/3 = −1.
The states of the Ashkin-Teller model can alternatively
be represented by introducing two Ising spins (Sx,Tx = ±1)
at each site of the lattice and assigning the two-spin states
(+,+), (+,−), (−,+), and (−,−) to strategies 1, 2, 3, and
4, respectively [34,40,44]. In the latter notation the pair
interaction between the neighboring players x and y is given
by the following expression:
J0 + J ′SxSy + J ′′TxTy + J4SxSyTxTy. (14)
where two Ising models with coupling coefficients 4J ′ =
ε + ε′ − ε′′ − ε′′′ and 4J ′′ = ε − ε′ + ε′′ − ε′′′ are coupled via
four-body interactions characterized by 4J4 = ε − ε′ − ε′′ +
ε′′′. The J0 = ε term simply shifts the system’s ground-state
energy. The symmetry of the original ε parameters also
implies that the model is invariant under permutations of the
parameters J ′, J ′′, and J4 [45].
Even though, at first sight, the m-Ising-pair coordination
game might look similar to the Potts model in having n =
2m symmetry-related strategies (and, consequently, n-fold
degenerate ground states), this interaction is “less symmetric”
because its strategies are only pairwise interchangeable.
Furthermore, the traditional n-strategy Potts model is the linear
combination of all (and not just a few) n-strategy elementary
coordination games with equal strengths and an irrelevant
game component that shifts all payoffs by a constant value.
Finally, we mention that the equivalence between ferro-
magnetic and antiferromagnetic Ising models can be adapted
for each coordinated strategy pair by exchanging the suitable
strategy labels on one of the two equivalent sublattices [9,46].
This feature expands the validity region of the subsequent
calculations.
III. METHODS
A. Mean-field approximation
The difference between the m-Ising-pair coordination game
and the n = 2m-state Potts model already emerges at the
level of mean-field approximations. In these calculations it
is more convenient to use the scalar notation of strategies:
sx = k with k = 1,2, . . . ,nwhen player x uses her kth strategy.
The mean-field approximation describes the systems with the
average strategy frequencies (ρk). For translation invariant
connectivity structures the one-site probabilities [p1(k) = ρk]
of finding the kth strategy at any one of the sites are used
to express the probability of the microscopic state s as p(s) =∏
x p1(sx). Detailed descriptions of this approach (as well as its
generalized versions) are given in Refs. [12,47–49]. For these
methods the equilibrium values of strategy frequencies (or
n-site configuration probabilities) are determined as extremal
points of a thermodynamic potential, in our case

 = U + KS. (15)
Here U and S are the average values of the potential [U =∑
s p(s)U (s)] and the entropy [S = −
∑
s p(s) ln p(s)] of the
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FIG. 1. Strategy frequencies as a function of the noise level K
in the mean-field approximation of the two- and three-pair-Ising
coordination games. The solid lines correspond to the two-pair, while
the dashed lines represent the three-pair case.
whole system. It should be emphasized that in game-theoretic
systems payoffs, and therefore the potential, is maximal in the
ground state, contrary to physical systems where the energy is
minimal. This is why the thermodynamic potential 
 differs
from the usual free energy in the sign of the entropic term KS.
We have plotted the stable numerical solutions of the
mean-field theory of the two- and three-Ising-pair coordination
games in Fig. 1. Both plots clearly indicate the presence
of a continuous (critical) phase transition at K = Kc. For
K > Kc the equilibrium state is disordered, and all strategies
are present in the system with equal frequencies (ρk = 1/n).
This symmetry is spontaneously broken as the noise level
is lowered below a critical value: One strategy’s frequency
rises (labelled as strategy 1 in Fig. 1, but we also have a
similar, symmetry-related, equally preferred state for each of
the remaining strategies) while the frequencies of the other
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FIG. 2. Strategy frequencies plotted against the noise level K
in the four-strategy (m = 2) case. Strategies 1 and 2 (pluses and
crosses) belong to the first pair while strategies 3 and 4 (stars and
boxes) represent the second coordinated pair.
strategies diminish. At the same time the second strategy’s
frequency decreases at a faster rate than the rest, while the
symmetry of the other Ising pairs is retained.
At very low noise levels the system becomes homoge-
neously ordered. As only one Ising pair’s symmetry is broken
below the critical noise level, the remaining strategies are
found on neighboring sites with equal probabilities. This
means that at the mean-field level the expected payoff for
players following these strategies becomes zero, and therefore
the strategies themselves are effectively neutral. In other
words, the m-Ising-pair game is mean-field equivalent to the
2m-strategy elementary coordination game, whose mean-field
behavior was previously studied in Ref. [30].
We emphasize that the m-Ising-pair game has 2m equiva-
lent, equally preferred ordered ground states on a square lattice.
Similar degeneracy occurs for the 2m-state Potts model that
undergoes a first-order phase transition if n = 2m > 4 [32].
In light of the mean-field results we can introduce two order
parameters, namely M1(K,m) and M2(K,m). Without loss of
generality henceforth we assume that ρ1 → 1 in the low-noise
limit while ρ2 < ρ3 = ρ4 → 0. Then the order parameters can
be given by the average strategy frequencies as
M1(K,m) = ρ1 − ρ2, (16)
M2(K,m) = 1 − 2mρi if i > 2. (17)
For these choices both order parameters go to 1 in the
low-noise limit and vanish in the symmetric (high-noise)
states. Additionally, the mean-field analysis predicts algebraic
behaviors
Mj (K,m) ∝ (Kc(m) − K)βj (m) for j = 1,2, (18)
when K → Kc(m) from below. Figure 1 illustrates clearly that
Kc(2) = 2, β(mf)1 (2) = 1/2, and β(mf)2 (2) = 1. For m = 3 the
numerical investigation of the mean-field solution indicates
a significantly different continuous phase transition with
Kc(3) = 4/3, β1(3) = 1/4, and β2(3) = 1/2.
B. Monte Carlo simulations
Monte Carlo (MC) simulations were also performed to
investigate the features of coordination games A(m)I composed
of m = 2 and 3 elementary pair coordination components. The
games were studied on an N = L × L-site square lattice using
periodic boundary conditions in order to better approximate
infinite-size thermodynamic systems. The linear size of the
system was varied from L = 400 to 2000. Average strategy
frequencies ρi = 〈ρi(t)〉 were evaluated by averaging over a
sampling time ts after waiting for a relaxation time tr. Both
the sampling and relaxation times were varied between 103
and 106 Monte Carlo steps. During a Monte Carlo step each
of the players received one chance, on average, to change
their strategy. The larger system sizes and the longer run
times were used near the critical phase transitions to overcome
the effects of diverging fluctuations, correlation lengths, and
relaxation times. Furthermore, below the critical transition
points [K < Kc(m)] preordered initial states (with ρ1 = 1)
were used to reduce the duration of transient phenomena. (This
did not change the equilibrium state itself.)
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FIG. 3. Log-log plot of the order parameters versus the relative
noise level (Kc(2) − K)/Kc(2) for m = 2. The MC data of M1(K,2)
and M2(K,2) are denoted by open circles and squares. The solid line
shows Onsager’s exact result [42] for m = 1. The dashed line (with
a slope of 1/4) serves as a reference illustrating another power-law
behavior.
The MC data of strategy frequencies ρi (i = 1,2,3, and 4)
(see Fig. 2) clearly show that the system undergoes a
continuous phase transition at K (MC)c (2) ≈ 1.135(1). Within
our statistical error this MC result agrees with the theoretical
prediction of Eq. (12). Above this critical temperature the
system evolves into a disordered state, in which all available
strategies are played with an equal probability at any given
site. If K < Kc(2), then the symmetry of one of the Ising pairs
is broken.
Figure 3 illustrates quantitatively the critical (algebraic)
behavior of the order parameters M1(K,2) and M2(K,2)
when K → Kc(2) from below. We emphasize that Onsager’s
exact result for M1(K,1) and M1(K,2) coincide as functions
of relative noise levels (Kc(m) − K)/Kc(m). At the same
time this means that the critical exponent of M1(K,2) is
β
(MC)
1 (2) = 1/8.
The second order parameter M2(K,2) also follows a power
law with a larger exponent whose value can be approximated as
β
(MC)
2 (2)  1/4 within our statistical error. Accordingly, both
the mean-field approximation and the MC simulations predict
that β2/β1 = 2.
The power-law decrease of order parameters is generally
accompanied by the divergence of other quantities in the close
vicinity of the critical point. In order to explore this aspect of
the two-Ising-pair model our MC simulations were extended
to quantify the fluctuations of the order parameters. More
precisely, we have evaluated the following quantities:
χ1 = N [〈(ρ1(t) − ρ2(t))2〉 − (ρ1 − ρ2)2], (19a)
χ2 = N
n − 2
n∑
i>2
〈(ρi(t) − ρi)2〉, (19b)
χ ′ = N
n
n∑
i=1
〈(
ρi(t) − 1
n
)2〉
, (19c)
where χ1 measure the fluctuations of order parameter
M1(K,m) if K < Kc(m), χ2 quantifies the fluctuations for the
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FIG. 4. Log-log plot of fluctuations as a function of |K −
Kc(2)|/Kc(2) for m = 2. Open circles and boxes show the divergence
of χ1 and χ2 below the critical noise level. Black diamonds denote
MC data for χ ′ if K > Kc(2). The dashed line represents the trend of
divergence in χ1 and χ ′ for the two-dimensional Ising model (m = 1).
identical strategy frequencies ρi (2 < i  m, K < Kc(m)),
while χ ′ quantifies the fluctuation of strategy frequencies in
the disordered phase. It is worth mentioning that averaging
over equivalent strategies improves statistical accuracy. Fur-
thermore, these notations remain valid for n = 2m > 4.
From our MC simulations (see Fig. 4) one can conclude
that the above quantities diverge as |Kc(2) − K|−γ when
approaching the critical point. Within the statistical error the
value of the exponent γ agrees with those found for the two-
dimensional Ising model (γ = 7/4) [50–52]. These numerical
data suggest that the robustness of the Ising universality class
is not disturbed by an additional coordinated strategy pair in
the corresponding four-strategy evolutionary game. Here we
emphasize that similar phenomena were observed for models
where the coordinated strategy pair is extended by neutral
strategies [30,31].
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FIG. 5. Log-log plot of MC data for the order parameters
M1(K,3) (circles) and M2(K,3) (boxes) as a function of [Kc(3) −
K]/Kc(3). The solid and dashed lines (with slopes of 0.075 and 0.1,
respectively) correspond to the fitted power laws for M1(K,3) and
M2(K,3).
042101-5
BALÁZS KIRÁLY AND GYÖRGY SZABÓ PHYSICAL REVIEW E 96, 042101 (2017)
 0.01
 0.1
 1
 10
 100
 1000
 0.0001  0.001  0.01  0.1  1
flu
ct
ua
tio
ns
|Kc (3)-K |/Kc (3)
FIG. 6. Log-log plot of the MC results of χ1(K,3) (diamonds),
χ2(K,3) (boxes), and χ ′(K,3) (circles) versus the relative noise level.
The solid and dashed lines represent power laws with exponents
γ = 4/3 and 1.
Fitting the power-law assumption to the 13 data points
closest to the critical temperature yields the following
approximations of the critical exponents: β(f)1 (2) = 0.124(1),
β
(f)
2 (2) = 0.247(2), γ (f)1 (2) = 1.85(4), γ (f)2 (2) = 1.69(2), and
γ ′(f)(2) = 1.68(3).
A more accurate numerical analysis of the critical behavior
goes beyond the scope of this work. Instead, we briefly survey
the MC results obtained for the six-strategy model involving
three nonoverlapping coordinated strategy pairs. The tem-
perature dependence of strategy frequencies is qualitatively
similar to the one obtained in the m = 2 case. More precisely,
the system exhibits a continuous phase transition which only
breaks the symmetry of one of the constituent Ising pairs. In
agrement with expectations, the critical temperature is lower,
according to the MC simulations K (MC)c (3) = 0.9084(1). Here
the duality relations cannot be used to deduce exact analytical
result. Figure 5 illustrates the power-law behavior of M1(K,3)
with an estimated exponent of β1(3) = 0.075. On the same
figure M2(K,3) increases with an approximated slope of
β2(3) = 0.1.
Figure 6 illustrates the divergence of the quantities χ1, χ2,
and χ ′ in the close vicinity of the critical point for m = 3.
Contrary to the case of m = 2, here we can predict two values
for the γ exponents: γ1(3)  4/3 and γ2(3) = γ ′(3)  1.
Fitting the 13 data points closest to the critical points
gives the following critical exponents: β(f)1 (3) = 0.0745(5),
β
(f)
2 (3) = 0.102(1), γ (f)1 (3) = 1.33(2), γ (f)2 (3) = 1.08(2), and
γ ′(f)(3) = 0.93(2).
IV. SUMMARY
In this paper we have investigated the critical phase
transitions in evolutionary potential games with n = 4 or 6
strategies when the pair interactions are made up of two or three
nonoverlapping elementary coordination games describing
equivalent Ising-like interactions between the strategy pairs.
The players are located at the sites of a square lattice, they
interact with their four nearest neighbors, and their strategy
updates are dictated by the logit rule and stationary states are
described by the Boltzmann distribution [12].
These models share some important features with some
traditional models, namely the ground state is n-fold degen-
erate and these systems exhibit a continuous order-disorder
phase transition when the noise level is increased from zero.
For n = 4 three equivalent models can be distinguished, one of
which is identical to the four-state clock model [33]. The linear
combinations of these three components reproduce the set of
Ashkin-Teller models [43] for which a duality relation [53,54]
can be exploited to exactly determine the critical noise level
[41]. Mean-field theory suggests that two order parameters can
be introduced as suitable combinations of strategy frequencies.
These quantities vanish algebraically when approaching the
critical point from below. Using Monte Carlo simulations
we have determined the corresponding critical exponents for
both order parameters and also for the diverging fluctuations
of strategy frequencies. The comparison of these data with
the exact results of the traditional Ising model has indicated
some surprising coincidences. Namely, the exact critical noise
level is half of that characteristic of the Ising model [41].
Furthermore, within statistical error the plot of ρ1-ρ2 versus the
relative noise level reproduces Onsager’s result for the magne-
tization of the Ising model. This means that one of the critical
exponents of the order parameters is β1 = 1/8 while the other
seems to be β2 = 1/4. At the same time the fluctuations of
the strategy frequencies diverge algebraically with the same
exponent when approaching the critical point from both sides.
For the six-strategy model the continuous order-disorder
phase transition can also be characterized by two order
parameters. According to our Monte Carlo analysis the critical
exponents are smaller than those found for n = 4. Contrary
to the previous case, the divergence of strategy frequency
fluctuations at the critical point can be characterized by two
different exponents.
Finally, we emphasize that all the above discussed models
posses some symmetries in the structure of pair interactions
(matrices) belonging to the class of coordination type games
[17]. One can introduce, however, further symmetric com-
binations of elementary coordination games that can also
result in critical phase transitions that do not belong to any
of the traditional universality classes [50,55]. Accordingly,
the possible combinations can give us a framework for the
classification of universality classes.
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